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Abstract 
Research in information systems includes a wide range of approaches which make a contribution in 
terms of knowledge, understanding, or practical developments. The measure of any research is, 
ultimately, its validity – are its finding true, or its recommendations correct? However, empirical 
studies show that discussion of validity in research is often weak. In this paper we examine the 
nature of truth and correctness in order to construct a validation framework that can encompass all 
the varied forms of research. Within philosophy, there has been much debate about truth – is it 
correspondence, coherence, consensual or pragmatic – and in fact current views revolve around the 
idea of a pluralist view of truth – it is one and many. Related to truth is the concept of correctness, 
and in particular the necessity of both internal correctness and external correctness. The framework 
we develop based on these concepts of truth and correctness has been applied to a range of 
research forms including positivist, mathematical, interpretive, design science, critical and action 
oriented. The benefits are: i) that a greater and more explicit focus on validity criteria will produce 
better research; ii) having a single framework can unite what at times seem conflicting approaches 
to research; iii) having criteria made explicit should encourage debate and further development. 
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A Framework for Validating IS Research Based on a 
Pluralist Account of Truth and Correctness 
INTRODUCTION 
Information systems is a wide ranging discipline involving varied forms of research with 
different purposes. There is research aimed at producing knowledge, from a variety of 
perspectives – positivist (Dubé et al. 2003; Straub et al. 2004), interpretive (Klein et al. 1999; 
Walsham 2006a), critical (Klein et al. 2004; Mingers 2004) and more; research that aims at 
producing software or IT/IS artifacts – design science (Hevner et al. 2004); and research that 
hopes to bring about improvements to organizational problems – action research (Chiasson 
et al. 2009). These heterogeneous forms of research are carried out in many different ways; 
based on different and sometimes conflicting assumptions; and often use fundamental 
concepts such as “information”, “theory”, “causality” or “knowledge” incompatibly.  
We are not against the idea of pluralism in IS research at all (Mingers 2001a; Mingers 2001c) 
but we do agree with Lee (Lee 1991; Lee et al. 2009; Lee et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2015a) that 
there needs to be some degree of coherence or rigor underlying these multifarious 
approaches in order to justify and validate the results that end up being published in our 
journals and used as a basis for affecting peoples’ lives.  
In this paper we will investigate one, crucial, element of research – that of truth or 
correctness which in many ways underlies all the others. Scholarly research in any field aims 
to produce knowledge, not least within IS where we also have the specific domain of 
knowledge management which appears to have knowledge as its subject matter (Mingers 
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2008). This immediately begs the question of what exactly is knowledge, and how does it 
differ from mere belief or opinion? Traditionally, within philosophy, knowledge is said to be 
“justified true belief” (Gettier 1963; Pritchard 2006), that is, it is a kind of belief or opinion 
but one for which we have evidence or warrant, and, essentially, is actually true whether or 
not we can in fact determine its truth1. This leads to the further question, what exactly is 
truth for unless we know what truth is, we cannot understand what knowledge is2  
That truth is indeed a goal of IS research has been expressed, for example, by Straub et al 
(2004) “The purpose of validation is to give researchers, their peers, and society as a whole 
a high degree of confidence that positivist methods being selected are useful in the quest 
for scientific truth” (p. 383). However, in most papers, including that one, the actual nature 
of truth and how it might be discovered is little discussed. 
There is a traditional view within philosophy - the correspondence theory of truth (Lynch 
2001) – perhaps best expressed by Aristotle: “ To say that that which is, is, and that that 
which is not, is not, is true”.  To some extent this is a truism, but to clearly articulate a 
theory of truth we need to specify its elements: what is it that can have this truth property 
(the truth bearer); what is it that could make the truth bearer true (the truth maker); and 
what is the nature of the correspondence relation? 
There have, however, been many criticisms of the correspondence view of truth, 
particularly in terms of its realist view of the external world, and this led to a number of 
alternatives. For example, coherence theory which evaluates a belief in terms of it 
                                                        
1
 There are very different views of knowledge, for example Foucault (1980) who sees knowledge as ultimately 
constituted through power, and postmodernism that perhaps denies the possibility of knowledge at all but 
these will not be pursued in this paper. 
2 We recognize the inevitable circularity here – knowledge requires truth, but truth requires knowledge. 
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coherence or consistency with other well-attested beliefs (Walker 1989); pragmatism which 
focusses on long-term success in practice (James 1976; Peirce 1878) or consensus theory 
(Habermas 1978) which sees truth as that which a relevant community of enquirers agrees 
about. A more radical approach, known as deflationism (Quine 1992; Strawson 1950), 
suggests that actually truth has no substantive nature to be explained, and that it is really 
just a linguistic pseudo-problem. 
In the face of the seeming stand-off between these competing positions, a new approach 
has been developing that aims to retain the idea that truth is a substantive concept, and 
some form of realism about the relation to the external world, whilst accepting the 
criticisms of standard correspondence theory. This approach involves a pluralist view of 
truth – truth is one and truth is many – there are generic characteristics of truth but these 
may be realized differently in different domains (Lynch 1998; Pedersen et al. 2013c). In the 
physical domain one might hold a correspondence view while in the mathematical domain 
one might have a coherence view. 
Whilst truth may be a defining characteristic of knowledge, as we saw above not all IS 
research aims purely at knowledge - design science aims to produce effective software or 
artifacts, and action research aims to solve problems in organizations. In these domains it 
may not be appropriate to talk about truth but rather the related term correctness (Engel 
2013; Thomson 2008). It seems more appropriate to say a computer system works” 
correctly” rather than “truly”.  In many areas they seem equivalent – if a belief is true then it 
will also be correct, while a belief that is incorrect would thereby be false. But correctness is 
a wider term than truth in that it applies to things other than beliefs or propositions, for 
example actions or procedures.  
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The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to develop a general conceptualization of truth and 
correctness that can be applied across all areas of research in IS. Essentially, this will specify 
criteria for evaluating the rigor and validity of the research whatever its particular 
philosophy or method. This is akin to the proposal of Lee and Hubona (2009) that the 
fundamental logical laws of modus ponens and modus tollens can be applied across 
research methods to produce more rigorous research. 
In the first section of the paper we develop the pluralist view of truth. Specific theories of 
truth are explained in Appendix A. In the next section we link truth to correctness and 
produce an overall framework of truth and correctness. Then in the third section of the 
paper we apply the framework to a variety of research approaches – positivist statistical 
analysis, mathematical modelling and simulation, interpretive research, critical research and 
finally action research. In the final section we discuss the benefits of this framework. 
PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF TRUTH 
The issue of truth3 revolves around two questions – does truth have a nature than can be 
analyzed? And, if so, what is that nature? The first question has provoked major debates 
between substantialist  or robust theories of truth which claim that there is an analyzable 
nature and deflationist theories which claim that there actually is not an underlying nature 
to truth, there are no mysteries to explain. The major question for substantialist theories is 
realism in the sense of an external world to which beliefs can correspond. In this paper we 
will be primarily concerned with substantialist theories since deflationist theories leave little 
to actually be discussed. The various theories of truth are explained in Appendix A. 
                                                        
3 For good introductions to modern discussions of truth see Lynch (2001), Engel (2002) or Kunne (2003) 
7 
 
Pluralist theories 
Pluralist theories represent a new development in response to the stand-off between the 
theories described above. Generally, many philosophers do wish to maintain a substantive 
version of truth and do see correspondence theory as the most intuitive approach and so, in 
response to the criticisms of correspondence, they have developed the general idea that 
there may be different versions of truth dependent on the domain of knowledge concerned.  
There are three possible approaches (Pedersen et al. 2013a) – strong pluralism which sees 
only many versions of truth with no overarching unity to them, a position not held by many. 
Weak pluralism, which holds that truth is one and many – there is a general conception of 
truth, often characterized in terms of a number of properties that all forms of truth must 
have (called platitudes or truisms),  which is realized differently in different domains. And 
what could be called correspondence pluralism which maintains that there is only 
correspondence theory but this itself can be differentially realized. Some argue that this is 
not properly alethic pluralism (Barnard et al. 2013). 
Putnam (1994) was perhaps the first to suggest that there are many ways in which 
propositions can relate to reality and that therefore the word “true” may be realized 
differently depending on whether we are talking about physical reality, mathematics or 
morality. Lynch (1998) followed up with a functionalist approach asking what are the 
functions of truth – e.g., objective, correct to believe, and aimed at facilitating enquiry – 
suggesting that these functions could be met in different ways. Pedersen and Wright 
(2013c) provides a state of the art view of alethic pluralism (Smith 2015). 
Weak pluralism 
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Edwards (2011; 2013) likens truth to the notion of winning a game. We have a general idea 
of what winning is, but each game is different. To win at chess you need to checkmate; to 
win at tennis you need the majority of available sets. Thus, there is some unity of what it 
means to win or to be a winner that is independent of the particular game involved. And 
yet, determining the winner is different in each game.  
In terms of truth, the unity of truth can be captured by a collection of “platitudes” such as 
“truth is the goal of enquiry” or “truth is a property that is distinct from justification” which 
describe the nature of truth in general. To see how propositions (he uses propositions as 
truth bearers) can come to have this truth property we then need to look at specific 
domains to see what it is that is accepted to generate truth in that domain. This has two 
aspects: first we would have to study the subject-matter of the domain to see what type it is 
– for example is it genuinely representational  or simply discursive or logical. Second, we 
need to see what kind of property can establish truth in the domain, for example a 
correspondence between propositions and nonlinguistic entities; a coherence between 
linguistic entities; or a procedure or proof.  
We can then form conditionals such as: 
 In arithmetical discourse, if <p> coheres with basic axioms then <p> is true. 
Or, alternatively: 
 In arithmetical discourse, <p> is true iff <p> coheres with basic axioms. 
So, a proposition that is found to be true according to the criteria of its domain is also true 
generally. 
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This approach is only a framework and there would be many details to work out: 
 Can we determine an exhaustive list of platitudes to define truth in general? 
 How do we decide the nature and scope of the various domains? 
 Can we determine their content and criteria adequately and is there an agreed 
criterion for truth in each one? 
 Can we show that the individual truth criteria do in fact imply the truth platitudes? 
There are other versions of this approach which we will not discuss such as manifestation 
functionalism (Lynch 2009) and the disjunctivist view (Pedersen et al. 2013b). 
Correspondence pluralism 
Within this section we will discuss two approaches – Horgan and Fumerton. 
Horgan (Barnard et al. 2013; 2001) terms his approach “semantically correct assertability”  
(note the use of “correct” which links to the next section). Horgan is a realist accepting that 
there is a mind-independent and language independent world, although the world contains 
humans and their thoughts and activities which are clearly human-dependent. One of the 
things we do is make statements or assertions about the way the world is, and these 
statements may be right or wrong depending on how the world is, which is what we mean 
by truth. So for Horgan, truth is always correspondence. 
However, he recognizes that, in a discourse, there are two different aspects to the way we 
describe or assert things about the world: 
 Relevant semantics standards that govern the types of things discussed (terms) and 
their predicates (properties and relations) – called the “positing apparatus”. 
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 The actual world which may or may not be as it is described. 
In a small number of domains, it is possible that the terms and their predicates may directly 
correspond to elements of the real world. In these cases the semantic standards are 
maximally strict and we have a case of direct correspondence. However, in most discourses 
such a direct relation is not possible. The semantic apparatus is relatable to the world, and 
the world may or may not conform to it, thus truth is possible but in an indirect way. At the 
extreme, there may be a minimal dependence on the world and truth is defined almost 
entirely semantically. An example of this may be mathematics where there is only the 
semantic correctness with respect to mathematical axioms. 
Most everyday talk, and most scientific talk, lies between these extremes with assertions 
about the world being semantically mediated. Consider a statement like “in 2013 Amazon 
was the world’s biggest internet company with revenues of $88.99b” which was correct 
according to Wikipedia4. Most of the terms in this statement, such as company, revenue, 
even Amazon, are complex abstractions which cannot be observed directly in the world in 
the way that trees or tables can be.  Similarly, a statement like “two is the only prime 
number” is true even though, ontologically, the world may not contain evenness or 
primeness as such.  
The advantage of this approach is that under the traditional correspondence theory it was 
expected that there were specific truth makers holding a one-to-one correspondence with 
the elements of truth bearers. Under this view that is no longer necessary.   
                                                        
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_Internet_companies 
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“[C]laims are true because they really do correspond to the world, even if, (as is typically the 
case) their positing apparatus does not map directly onto objects, properties and relations 
that belong to the correct ontology” (Barnard et al. 2013,p. 8) 
With this approach we can accept that much of what is said is indeed true (although 
discovering which statements are true is different from defining the nature of truth), and 
that much everyday knowledge is also true. This obviously depends on the validity of the 
operative semantic standards but it is likely that they will be aligned with what may be 
epistemically warranted (i.e., the pragmatic approach to truth) even though the two must 
not be seen as the same. 
Fumerton (2013) also believes that all forms of truth are essentially correspondence 
between two elements, but he developed three ideas of particular interest. 
First, that correspondence is not necessarily between a belief or proposition and facts about 
the external world. It could be between beliefs or ideas and other sets of ideas as, arguably, 
Berkeley (1995) held – thus a form of coherence correspondence. Or, it could be between 
beliefs or ideas and perceptions of the world as Hume(1967 (orig. 1750)) held, thus making 
the facts (truth makers) not mind-independent. Or, it could be between pragmatic 
utterances and the intentions and sincerity of the speaker (Habermas 1984 )5. 
Second, that correspondence truth is not all or nothing, right or wrong. There can be 
different degrees of truth in the relations between our beliefs and the world in the same 
way that pictures or models may represent with different levels of detail or faithfulness.  In 
any case, our concepts, and even our most precise measurements always have a degree of 
                                                        
5 My suggestion, not Fumerton’s 
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vagueness or imprecision about them so that they cannot correspond with the world 
perfectly. Thus the degree of truth will depend on the form of representation (and the 
purpose for which it occurs). Equally, many properties, such as “tall”, are intrinsically 
relative not absolute. Thus Tom may be tall in general but not tall relative to the class of 
basketball players – these two assertions do not contradict each other, they are both true. 
Third, that there can be different representations of the same reality without these being 
necessarily incompatible, i.e., each could be true. This could occur because we investigate 
different aspects of the same world, e.g., through a microscope or through an x-ray, or with 
a painting or a photo; or it could be because we organize our observations differently 
perhaps because of different theoretical lenses. What correspondence theory could not 
accept is there being two incompatible pictures that are both claimed to be true: “that 
which cannot be stated without contradiction cannot be”. 
CORRECTNESS AND TRUTH 
Correctness 
Correctness is clearly related to truth: Horgan (2001) (above) talks of truth as “semantic 
correctness” and Floridi (2011b) discusses a “correctness theory of truth”.  In this section we 
will explore the notion of correctness with a view to seeing if it might be a more appropriate 
term for information systems. From its definition, correctness can mean three things – true 
or conforming with the facts; in accordance with accepted standards; and free from error. 
The third is essentially the obverse of the first two so we are left with two, the first 
essentially as a synonym for truth, at least as correspondence, and the second wider 
meaning as conforming to some accepted or agreed standards or norms (Finlay 2010).  
13 
 
Many things may be said to be correct or incorrect: mental states such as believing 
(doxastic) or knowing (factive); actions or performances such as a statistical analysis or a 
logon procedure; representations such as a map or a computer model; information; a move 
in a game; or an English sentence. What is it these all have in common and how does this 
relate to truth?  
 Thomson (2008), in a major work on norms, claims that correctness has two aspects: 
 Correctness is always relative to the kind of thing it is applied to. A map of England 
may only be correct as a map of England, not just correct in general. Correct is an 
attributive adjective like “good”, it is always relative to a kind, K. The kind, K, fixes 
what properties the thing needs to have to be correct, essentially an exemplar of 
what the kind (or set) K would be. These properties are descriptive not normative. 
Note that some kinds of things do not have such exemplars, e.g., pebbles  or shades 
of grey, and so cannot be correct or incorrect.  
 At least in the case of performances or actions, there is also a normative sense of 
correctness – the action has to be properly performed independently of whether it 
succeeds or not. The golf swing may be performed correctly but the ball is affected 
by the wind or a bad bounce. Or, it may be performed poorly, but the ball still goes 
near the hole by luck. 
Thompson calls the first kind external correctness (e-correctness) and the second internal 
correctness (i-correctness). For an action to be correct overall it must be both e- and i-
correct. Sosa (2009) goes further and suggests that the e-correctness must be caused by the 
i-correctness – it must be “apt”.  
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Engel (2013) considers the case of beliefs (which could of course be manifested in terms of 
propositions or statements) and proposes that the e-correctness is in fact truth – beliefs aim 
for truth and are e-correct when they are true. And the i-correctness is our evidential 
reasons (warrants) for believing them, which becomes normative in the sense that we 
should believe things for which we have strong evidence, whether or not they are in fact 
true. 
This provides an interesting if somewhat circular relation to truth. From the correctness 
perspective, many things may be correct or incorrect but for beliefs (and their manifestation 
in propositions or statements) their e-correctness is a matter of truth (however construed) – 
if they are true they are correct. But from the truth perspective, for Horgan (2001) and 
Floridi  (2011b),at least, truth is a matter of correctness in some form. This may appear 
circular, but it is a benign circularity as I shall show in the next section, in some domains 
truth and correctness are just the same property.  
A model for correctness and truth 
This section will construct a model for combining correctness and truth based on the ideas 
in the above discussion. 
Thomson’s distinction between e- and i-correctness is fundamental and is the same as 
distinctions in other fields. In particular, it is essentially the same as Horgan’s distinction 
between the semantic standards of a domain (i-correctness) and the correspondence 
relations between assertions and the way the world is (e-correctness). For Horgan, all 
(discursive) domains have i-correctness, assuming they are coherent and well-formed 
domains, while some have direct e-correctness and some only indirect e-correctness. 
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It is also the same as the distinction made within the context of model and research 
validation (Boudreau et al. 2001; Kleijnen 1995; Lee et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2014; Lee et al. 
2015a; Lukka et al. 2010; Sargent 2013a; Venkatesh et al. 2013). Although different terms 
may be used, essentially there are two distinct stages to model validation which we will call 
verification and validation. Verification concerns the internal structure of the model, 
whether it is a statistical model, a simulation model, or indeed a piece of interpretive 
research. Validation concerns the external aspect of the model – whether it adequately 
represents that which it is a model of. Thus verification is i-correctness and validation is e-
correctness. Within statistics and measurement theory, these are often termed precision 
(the degree of replicability of repeated measurements) and accuracy (the closeness of the 
measurement to the quantity’s true value). 
 
Entity to which “correctness” 
may be applied as a type of K 
i-correctness, verification, 
precision, normative 
e-correctness, validation, 
accuracy, descriptive 
Doxastic mental states, e.g., 
believing, guessing, 
hypothesizing 
Whether the belief is 
supported by sound 
evidence 
Whether the belief is in fact 
the case (truth to different 
degrees) 
Factive mental states, e.g., 
knowing, perceiving 
Not relevant except that 
they are coherently 
expressed 
True by definition 
Assertions, propositions, 
sentences 
Whether the assertion meets 
the semantic standards of 
the domain including 
Whether what is asserted is 
the case (truth) 
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justification 
Representations, e.g., maps, 
pictures, models, 
descriptions, theories 
Whether they meet the 
standards and norms for the 
type 
The extent to which they 
correspond with that which 
they represent given their 
purpose (truth, practicality) 
Procedures, e.g., a 
mathematical proof, logging 
into a computer account 
Whether it follows to rules 
and axioms 
Whether it succeeds 
 (hacking an account would 
be e-correct but not i-correct 
Information Whether the signs carrying 
the information are 
semantically meaningful 
Whether the content of the 
information is the case. This 
depends on what the 
information is about (truth 
of different kinds) 
Actions, e.g., playing a game, 
tying a tie, performing a 
sonata, riding a bike 
Whether they are performed 
in the right way according to 
the standards or rules 
Whether they produce the 
right result 
Normative kinds of artefacts 
which may be good or 
defective, e.g., machines, 
computer systems 
Whether it exemplified the 
standards appropriate to its 
kind (form) 
Whether the object has the 
properties that would make 
it a “good” example of its 
kind (function) 
Table 1 The concept of correctness applied to different domains 
We will briefly explain the model here and then look at particular parts in more detail in the 
context of information systems. In Table 1, the first column give a (non-exhaustive) list of 
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entities or types to which the term correctness could be applied (correctness-bearers!). The 
next two columns describe the relevant forms of i- and e- correctness. 
Representation cover a range of things that may have different purposes – a picture or 
photo may just describe something; a theory may explain why something happened; a 
simulation model may try and replicate behavour. Whether they are e-correct depends both 
on their correspondence but also the purpose – a map of the London underground is not 
correct in terms of walking the streets. 
Procedures are specified steps that need to be undertaken to achieve a result. A 
mathematical proof does not correspond to anything but, starting form axioms and 
following logical rules it can generate a conclusion. It is i-correct in terms of adhering to the 
rules and potentially other criteria such as elegance or simplicity. It is e-correct in 
demonstrating the result. Logging into an account is e-correct if it succeeds. It may not be i-
correct if done in the wrong way, for example by hacking. 
Information is a disputed phenomenon with different conceptions (McKinney et al. 2010). 
Some, such as Floridi (2011a) and Mingers  and Standing (2014a), argue that information is 
both objective and true in which case its i-correctness is its semantic meaningfulness and its 
e-correctness is its truth in some form. Others (Checkland et al. 1998b) argue that it is 
subjective and not necessarily true in which case it is difficult to understand what might be 
correct information. 
There are many artefacts, especially humanly produced, which may have the property of 
“being a good K” if there are standards or properties which exemplars of such a kind exhibit. 
A good toaster produces evenly browned toast; a good information system produces 
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accurate, timely, relevant information in an easy to use way. For these, the e-correctness 
involves meeting the specified goodness criteria, which may often be in terms of functions. 
The i-correctness concerns the form of the artefact – is it aesthetically pleasing? Is it robust 
and easy to use? In these cases there could be disagreements about which properties were 
part of the function and which the form. 
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
We began by highlighting the importance of knowledge for IS, and arguing that knowledge is 
truth-constituted, i.e., it must be true to be knowledge. This led us to the concept of truth 
and we investigated various theories of truth, especially the pluralist versions of truth which 
see it and many and one. From here, we considered the intimate connections between truth 
and the wider concept of correctness, which could be said to subsume truth. We developed 
a framework for analyzing the nature of internal and external correctness in several 
domains. In the rest of the paper, we will apply this framework to a range of concepts and 
phenomena within information systems. 
In actuality, the concept of truth itself is seldom discussed in IS research papers (Becker et 
al. 2007; Webb 2004), although there are many papers that debate the nature of validity for 
different forms of research (Johnson et al. 2006). As we said earlier, there are two distinct 
questions concerning truth – what is it, i.e., what is its nature? And how do we discover it, 
i.e., how do we tell true theories from false ones? We may call these the definitional and the 
justificational questions. The first part of the paper has been concerned with the first 
question, but we now move to the second, practical question – how do we justify our 
theories? 
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Justifying quantitative research 
Within IS, there is a considerable literature devoted to justifying empirical, quantitative 
research. Indeed there is strong line of good practice recommendations developing, in the 
main, from Cook and Campbell’s  (1979) treatise on quasi-experimentation. This was picked 
up by Straub (1989) and further developed in theoretical (Bagozzi 2011; Im et al. 2015; 
MacKenzie et al. 2011; Shadish et al. 2002; Straub et al. 2004; Venkatesh et al. 2013) and 
empirical studies (Boudreau et al. 2001; King et al. 2005). Theoretically, this approach ties in 
directly with our correctness framework: 
“We use the term validity to refer to the approximate truth of an inference. When we say 
something is valid, we make a judgement about the extent to which relevant evidence 
supports that inference as being true or correct … Validity is a property of inferences. It is 
not a property of designs or methods” (Shadish et al. 2002, p. 34) 
Whether it does in practice is more debatable. 
The original work (Campbell 1957) distinguished between internal and external validity (cf 
internal and external correctness above) while Cook and Campbell (1979) added construct 
validity and statistical validity. Straub et al (2004) develop these as shown in Table 2 
(construct validity becomes a part of instrument validity).  
Validity type Meaning Means of assessment 
Instrument validity Assesses the validity of 
the research instrument, 
typically a questionnaire 
or experiment 
 
 Content Do the instrument Literature review, 
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measures adequately 
reflect the content of the 
construct they are 
measuring?  
expert judgement 
 Construct 
o Discriminant 
o Convergent 
o Factorial 
o Nomological 
o Predictive 
Do the measures 
converge on the 
construct and not on 
other distinct constructs? 
Statistical methods 
such as CFA, SEM, PCA; 
 
 
Judgmental 
comparison; 
Quantitative 
comparison 
 Reliability 
o Consistency 
o Test/Retest 
o Split half 
o Inter-rater 
 
Are the 
results/responses 
repeatable? 
 
Cronbach’s alpha 
Internal validity Are there alternative 
causal explanations for 
the observed data? 
Not discussed 
Statistical validity Are the results 
sufficiently statistical 
robust that they are 
unlikely to have occurred 
by chance? 
Rsquared, F, SEM 
See (Gefen et al. 2000) 
External validity To what extent can the 
findings be generalized 
to other populations and 
settings? 
Not discussed 
Table 2 Four forms of validity for positivist research summarized from Straub et al (2004) 
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These forms of validity take on quite specific meanings. First, we should note that although 
the title of the paper (Straub et al. 2004) is “Validation guidelines for IS positivist research”, 
which is quite general, in fact the guidelines only refer to specific forms of statistical 
research in which there are some underlying latent, subjective constructs, and relationships 
between them, which are then operationalized in terms of particular quantitative measures 
and an instrument to collect data. The instrument is assumed to be some form of 
questionnaire or perhaps experiment. The title of Straub’s (1989) earlier paper, “Validating 
instruments in MIS research” is perhaps more accurate. The point is that there are other 
forms of quantitative research beyond surveys and statistics, popular as they may be. 
Moreover, most of the discussion concerns the fairly technical issues of instrument validity 
and statistical validity rather than the more general ones of internal and external validity. 
Again, these latter concepts are defined quite narrowly, and perhaps counter-intuitively, in 
this approach – internal validity only concerns the possibility of there being other causal 
relationships, i.e., explanations, that are not included in the model. In many ways this seems 
like an external factor since it makes direct reference to the external worlds beyond the 
model, and cannot really be dealt with from a purely internal perspective.  
Equally, the idea that external validity primary concerns the extent to which the results can 
be generalized to other populations and settings (King et al. 2005) seems mistaken. As 
Reichardt (2011) argues, the fundamental purpose of validation is to assess the truth of the 
inferences made in the model, it is not particularly concerned with how wide or narrow 
those inferences are.: “As long as a generalization about a causal relationship is true, it is 
externally valid even if the generalization is exceedingly narrow” (p. 46).Whilst 
generalizability is an important and much debated (Lee et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2012; Seddon 
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et al. 2015; Tsang et al. 2012), characteristic of a statistical finding, it is a separate issue from 
the question of validity. 
We should also note that this approach to validity does not properly separate validity from 
precision (Reichardt 2011). One of the fundamental distinctions in statistical inference is 
that between accuracy and precision. An estimate or inference may be accurate but 
imprecise (having wide confidence intervals) or it may be inaccurate but precise. Validity 
concerns the accuracy of the inference rather than its precision but these are conflated in 
the validity typology. 
Finally, this approach makes almost no reference to the fundamental issue of designing the 
study in the first place in such a way that the eventual results will form valid answers to the 
research questions. It takes for granted the development of appropriate constructs, 
hypotheses of the relationships between them, and the initial determination of the 
appropriate measures and data collection instrument and yet arguably these factors are 
much more important for overall validity or correctness of the research findings that is 
instrument validity (Johnston et al. 2010). As the empirical research shows (Boudreau et al. 
2001; Jones 2004; King et al. 2005; Straub 1989), in many cases of papers published in 
leading journals even the most basic aspects such as describing and justifying the methods 
of data collection and analysis are absent. 
Lee and Hubona (2009) provide an alternative approach to validation. Their primary aim is 
to produce a framework that can apply to both qualitative and quantitative research based 
on the logical forms of argument – modus ponens (p implies q; p; therefore q) and modus 
tollens (p implies q; not q; therefore not p) which they call the MPMT framework. They 
distinguish between formative validity and summative validity (taking these terms from 
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education research) and suggest that much IS research involves formative validity but little 
summative validity. Formative validity is the process of forming or producing the theory or 
inference and so this type of validity concerns the extent to which the research has correctly 
followed an accepted procedure. Summative validity is a characteristic of the sum result or 
product of the process that has been followed. It involves comparing the consequences or 
predictions of the theory with observed evidence according to the logic of modus tollens. If 
a consequence or prediction of the theory cannot in fact be observed then the theory does 
not have summative validity and could potentially be rejected. Lee and Hubona show that 
this approach can apply to quantitative research, qualitative research, and even systems 
design – a system may be designed according to an accepted systems design methodology 
and yet still fail to meet its aims. They also argue that of the two, summative validity is more 
important than formative validity even though in practice it is seldom demonstrated, 
particularly in positivist research. 
In order to generate summative validity in statistical-type research (which is the content of 
this particular section), Lee and Hubona argue that statistical validity in the sense of 
significance tests or confidence intervals for various fitted parameters which constitute the 
hypothesized relationship is not sufficient. This is actually part of formative validity. As well 
as this it is necessary to test the theory’s predictive capabilities on out-of-sample data points 
using hold-out samples or cross-validation. We should note, however, a very common 
problem pointed out by Lee and Hubona – the fallacy of affirming the consequent. If we find 
that the predictions are in fact correct, does that prove or confirm the theory? The answer is 
unfortunately no, since there could always be some other explanation which actually 
accounts for the results. This can be expressed in logic – p implies q; q; therefore p – which 
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is not a valid inference. This point relates to Straub’s issue of internal validity which 
concerns alternative explanations. We would suggest that this is mis-named and is really 
external or summative validity – as well as trying to confirm the predictions one also need to 
actively try and eliminate alternative explanations (cf. the section on critical realism below). 
In comparison with the correctness framework, it seems clear that Lee and Hubona’s 
approach fits it very well. Formative validity is essentially the same as internal correctness, 
while summative validity is the same as external correctness and the two are related but 
independent. We would hope that formative validity (i-correctness) would lead to 
summative validity (e-correctness) but it is not guaranteed; while it would be possible to 
reach summatively valid conclusions even through research that was formatively weak. 
Other forms of quantitative research 
The previous section was primarily concerned only with statistical type research but there 
are many other forms of quantitative research of potential relevance, for example 
simulation or mathematical modelling. In this section we will briefly consider simulation as 
representative of these. 
Simulation involves building a computer model that is intended to replicate the behavior of 
a real-world system of interest. There are three major types – discrete event (DES), system 
dynamics (SD) and agent-based modelling (ABM) – which employ different modelling 
techniques but are similar in terms of validation. Simulations are generally developed for a 
specific purpose – better understanding of a system, improvement of the system’s 
operations, or the design of a new system – and therefore involve decision-makers and 
others affected by the results. It is important for these stakeholders that they have 
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confidence in the correctness of the simulation and its results (Sargent 2013b). Although 
there is a degree of debate, the correctness of a simulation is generally evaluated in terms 
of verification and validation (Robinson 1997) although its credibility with users is also 
important (Robinson 2002).  
Sargent (2013b) illustrates these concepts in terms of three elements – the object system 
that is to be simulated, the conceptual model of that system, and the computerized version 
of that conceptual model. Verification then concerns the correctness of the model and its 
computer implementation while validation has several components – conceptual model 
validation that the conceptual model is a correct representation of the object system; 
operational validation that the outputs of the computer model are sufficiently accurate with 
respect to the object system for the purpose at hand; and data validation that the available 
data is sufficiently correct for model building, evaluation and testing. 
The three forms of validity are independent but inter-related. If the conceptual model is 
invalid, than it is unlikely that the final model will have operational validity. If appropriate 
valid data is not available then a valid conceptual model could be built but then not 
operationalized. It is also important to emphasizes that validity is not absolute but always 
relative to the purposes of the simulation exercise – to understand puzzling behavior a fairly 
simple model  may be sufficient, but to help operate a complex production plant the model 
may need to be highly detailed and complex6. The general advice is to keep the model as 
simple as is possible to meet the objectives (Robinson 2007). Credibility depends to some 
extent on validity – a verified and validated model should generate credibility – but special 
                                                        
6
 The point that validity is not absolute but relative to purpose also applies to the statistical modelling 
discussed above but is seldom mentioned. 
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steps may be taken to improve it, for example participation by stakeholders in the 
development process and techniques such as hi-res animated graphical outputs. 
There are many techniques and tests used in verification and validation (Sargent 2013b), for 
example for verification there are comparison with other models, extreme conditions tests, 
degeneracy tests, sensitivity analysis, replications, trace tests, while for validity there are 
predictive validation, comparison with historical data, event validation, face validation, 
graphical animation or structured walkthrough. 
In terms of our framework then clearly verification is i-correctness and the various forms of 
validation are e-correctness. Credibility is interesting in that it could be regarded as separate 
from the correctness of the model, or it could be regarded as the ultimate form of e-
correctness – if the model is not believable for the clients then it fails no matter how good it 
was. These forms of validity can also be related to the different theories of truth (Becker et 
al. 2005; Schmid 2005). Clearly the primary forms of validity rely on correspondence theory; 
verification, especiually comparison with other models, can be seen as coherence theory, 
and the issue of credibility can be seen as pragmatic – rationally/consensus – rationally 
acceptable under ideal epistemic conditions. 
Justifying qualitative research 
Qualitative or interpretive research is a much more complex area in terms of validation and 
truth (Cole et al. 2007; Goldkuhl 2012; Myers et al. 2002a; Myers et al. 2002b; Walsham 
2006b). First, there are a wide variety of methods that differ significantly in their ontological 
and epistemological assumptions from relatively objective post-positivist approaches such 
as grounded theory (Glaser et al. 1967) through textual analyses such as semiotics (Mingers 
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et al. 2014b; Mingers et al. 2014c) or discourse analysis (Cukier et al. 2009)to highly 
subjectivist ones such as phenomenology (Mingers 2001b). Second, there is debate even 
within methods as to the possibilities of some form of external validation and some 
researchers would deny this possibility altogether. Papers in IS that provide guidance on 
doing interpretive research generally fail to discuss validity. For example, Klein and Myers’ 
(1999) authoritative paper provides seven principles that should be applied in interpretive 
research (primarily limited to hermeneutics) but say little about validation principles. 
Similarly, Sarker et al (2013) review empirical studies and also offer guiding principles but do 
not discuss validation. 
Interpretive research begins from the position that its object of study, whether it is actions, 
texts, beliefs or discourse, is socially constructed by the actors involved. Therefore, its 
primary task is to gain an authentic understanding (verstehen) of that meaning in the terms 
of the actors who produce it rather than in terms of theory, or the interpretations of the 
researchers. For some researchers, e.g., ethnographers, that is sufficient whereas others 
would want to go on and interpret the results and perhaps relate them to theory.  
Moving to possible validity criteria, some of the first were proposed by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985; Shenton 2004) as a direct analog to the criteria for positivist research discussed (and 
criticized) above: internal validity – credibility; external validity – transferability; statistical 
validity – confirmability; and reliability – dependability. They later argued that (Lincoln et al. 
1986)  these criteria are overly influenced by the concerns of positivist research and 
suggested that these four constituted the trustworthiness of research but other conditions 
concerned with the wider application and results of the enquiry were also needed which 
they called termed authenticity. 
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Maxwell (1992) suggested three forms of criteria based partly on different stages of the 
project. First is descriptive validity which solely concerns the quality of the data production 
process – that it is comprehensive, accurate and not subject to dispute (although the 
participants may themselves hold different and perhaps contradictory viewpoints, these 
should be faithfully recorded). The second is interpretive validity which goes beyond merely 
recording events, actions and discourse to generating interpretations of it, but still from the 
participants’ point of view not the researchers. This has been described as an “emic” 
viewpoint rather than an “etic” viewpoint (Headland et al. 1990), an insider rather than an 
outsider one. Interpretive validity involves the faithfulness or authenticity of the account to 
those involved, but even here the boundaries are blurred because actors are not always 
fully transparent to themselves and, as Giddens (1979) emphasizes, there are often 
unknown conditions and motivations for action. The third form of validity is theoretical 
validity which does move away from an emic account to an etic one. The researcher aims to 
develop theories that may explain the particular observed behaviors.  Theory could come in 
two directions, from within as in the case of grounded theory where the theory is developed 
internally from the research material, or from without as theory that already exists is 
applied to explain the situation. 7 
Lee and Hubona (2009) argue that their MPMT framework applies equally to interpretive 
research. They give the example of the hermeneutic understanding of a text whereby (in 
terms of summative validity) if the researcher has a correct interpretation of the text then it 
should be consistent with any particular passage or set of passages (MP). But, if a 
                                                        
7
 Maxwell does discuss two other forms of validity – generalizability and evaluative validity. We consider the 
former, as argued in the section on quantitative research, to be orthogonal to the primary question of truth 
and validity. The question of evaluation, i.e., judging actions to be right or wrong, will be considered further in 
the section on critical research. 
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contradiction arises then that implies that the interpretation is not correct (MT). They 
suggest that this approach is a realization of the hermeneutic circle. This is the only actual 
example they give, but they do analyze a set of interpretive papers and find that all but one 
only discuss formative validity, in terms of the processes employed, and do not try and test 
their interpretation in a summative way. For testing summative validity in research 
approaches other than hermeneutics they follow Sanday’s (1979) and Schutz’s (1962) 
proposal that it should be understandable and acceptable to actors in the situation and 
potentially enable a stranger to act appropriately within the culture. This can be termed 
authenticity. 
Venkatesh et al (2013), based on a consideration of several of the above typologies, suggest 
another three fold classification: i) design validity (which includes descriptive validity, 
credibility and transferability); ii) analytical validity (including theoretical validity, 
dependability, consistency and plausibility); and iii) inferential validity (including interpretive 
validity and confirmability). In comparison with Maxwell’s typology, this one seems rather 
confusing to us. Design validity actually includes elements descriptive and interpretive 
validity (i.e., concerned with the validity of the process) mixed with generalizability. 
Analytical validity seems to include elements of both interpretive validity and theoretical 
validity, while inferential validity seems to go back to interpretive validity rather than to 
inferences beyond the situation. 
This whole area is clearly complex and confused in its terminology. From our validity and 
correctness point of view we wish to have a classification which is quite general and 
compatible with many of the particular approaches. We would therefore make one main 
distinction, that between emic and etic research. In emic research (which must necessarily 
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come before etic) the primary concern is with reproducing, in as authentic and rich a 
manner as possible, the way of life of the actors within a situation of interest, in their own 
terms. This includes both descriptive and interpretive validity in Maxwell’s model. Some 
research, for instance ethnography, may choose to stop there but increasingly there is a 
view that even ethnographic research should move towards some form of explanation 
(Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. 2008; Lukka et al. 2010). This etic account, either based on or 
generating theory, will be expressed in the researchers’ language and must be plausible to 
the research community. This is congruent with Cole and Avison’s (2007) use of the 
trustworthiness of the research process and the truthfulness of the results. Based on our 
correctness framework, both of these aspects of research will have both i-correctness 
(formative) and e-correctness (summative) validity criteria as shown in Table 4.  
Justifying system design: design science and action research 
We are considering these two somewhat different approaches together for two reasons. 
First, they share purposes that make them different from the research approaches we have 
so far considered – that is, they both aim to bring about beneficial change in organizations, 
one through the development of an IT artifact, the other through general activity which 
might include developing artifacts. Second, because these similarities have already been 
noted in the literature (Baskerville et al. 2009; Järvinen 2007; Lee 2007; Sein et al. 2011; 
Wieringa et al. 2012) although Iivari and Venables (2009) suggest the similarities may not be 
deep. But from the point of view of validation they do have commonalities. 
Design science is concerned with producing new and innovative IT artifacts to solve 
organizational problems (Hevner et al. 2004) although Lee et al (2015b) point out that it 
should be the IS artifact not just the IT artifact. As Hevner et al ((2004, p. 78) note, “design is 
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both a process (set of activities) and a product (artifact) – a verb and a noun” and this 
concords with the two aspects of correctness in our framework – i-correctness (formative) 
as conforming to a process or methodology, and e-correctness (summative)  as successfully 
achieving its goal or purpose (in this case in terms of its organizational stakeholders). 
Various proposals have been made for a design science methodology that has been 
integrated by Peffers et al (2007) into the following: 
1. Problem identification and motivation 
2. Define objectives for solution 
3. Design and development 
4. Demonstration 
5. Evaluation 
Note that here the 5th step is actually evaluation, in particular evaluating whether the 
artifact does indeed meet the objectives that were required of it (summative or e-
correctness).  
Venable et al (2012) have developed a detailed framework of different methods for 
assessing both formative and summative validity. It is based initially on the 5E’s approach to 
evaluation (Checkland et al. 1990) – Efficacy, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Elegance and 
Ethicality. Of these, Efficacy and Effectiveness primarily concern summative validity and the 
other three concern formative validity. Efficacy is the extent to which the artifact performs 
as it is designed to do whilst effectiveness is the extent to which performing those tasks is 
actually successful in the organizational context  - does it do what it is supposed to do, and 
is that the right thing to do? 
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In terms of formative validity, first was the artifact designed according to a rigorous 
methodology of whatever kind? Then there are questions as to whether it was developed 
with an economical use of resources (efficiency), according to ethical principles, and 
ultimately elegantly and aesthetically (the Mac vs the PC?)?  One would like to think that 
formative validity would lead to summative validity but unfortunately the high number of IS 
failures that still happen (Dwivedi et al. 2014; Georgiadou et al. 2006) shows that this is not 
the case. These forms of validity are shown in Table 4. 
Moving to action research, although as we have shown there are many who consider the 
two can be intimately linked, in terms of validation we will deal with them separately 
although Wieringa and Morah (2012) actually define the concept of “technical action 
research” as a specific method for evaluating design science.  Action research (AR) 
(Checkland et al. 1998a; Eden et al. 1996) has a long history dating back to Kurt Lewin (1946) 
and comes in many varieties including action learning (Revons 1993), action science (Argyris 
et al. 1985) and participatory action research (Whyte 1991). It has been recommended for 
research in information systems (Baskerville et al. 1998; Baskerville 1999; Chiasson et al. 
2009; Davison et al. 2004). 
Given this variety we will have to consider a very broad description of AR as being 
constituted by several elements performed in a cyclical manner: 
1. Initial recognition of problematic issue and entry of researcher 
2. Declaration of theories and methodologies thought to be relevant 
3. Undertaking action to improve the situation as both participant and researcher (in 
participatory AR the actors are also seen as participant researchers) 
4. Evaluate results in terms of improvement to the particular organizational situation 
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5. Evaluate results in terms of the theory/methodology used and disseminate 
In terms of the correctness or validation of the process (Baskerville et al. 1998; Checkland et 
al. 1998a; Eden et al. 1996), we can consider the i-correctness in terms of the extent to 
which the AR process was followed, and the e-correctness in terms of two distinct criteria – 
the success in terms of resolving the problem, and the learning and development of theory 
which may be applicable elsewhere. It is the latter which mainly distinguishes action 
research from pure consultancy. Checkland and Holwell (1998a) emphasize the importance 
of “recoverability”, that is explicit documentation of the process followed and decisions 
made which will help generate the theoretical lessons as well as allowing later critical 
scrutiny.  
Justifying a critical approach 
In this section we will cover a range of explicitly critical approaches mainly based on the 
work of theorists such as Bourdieu (Kvasny et al. 2006), Foucault (Willcocks 2004) and 
Habermas (Brocklesby et al. 1996; Howcroft et al. 2005; Klein et al. 2004; Myers et al. 2011); 
as well as critical realism (Johnston et al. 2010; Mingers 2004; Mingers et al. 2013), and 
critical versions of interpretive approaches such as critical ethnography (Myers 1997) and 
critical discourse analysis (Cukier et al. 2009). A critical approach, or the idea of critique, has 
two lineages one traceable to Kant and one to Marx (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2011; Mingers 
2000). Kantian critique concerns the limits of our knowledge and research methods while 
Marxist critique concerns the oppressive nature of society. Generally, both are involved in a 
critical approach. However, a critical approach is not primarily about research methods but 
about attitude and values (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2011; Morrow et al. 1994). In other words, 
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there are not specific critical research methods, rather traditional methods, both 
quantitative and qualitative, are used but with a critical intent. 
Alvesson and Deetz (2000) provide perhaps the most general framework for doing critical 
research that involves three stages8 : 
 Insight – hermeneutic understanding and the archaeology of knowledge. This stage 
involves gaining knowledge and appreciation of the situation of interest using a 
range of ordinary research methods, both qualitative and quantitative. But it will be 
guided by explicitly critical attitudes and values and will view the subjects as active 
participants in the research rather than passive objects.  
 Critique – deconstruction and the genealogy of knowledge This stage involves using 
varied critical theories and constructs to uncover and reveal the often hidden or 
suppressed mechanisms that distort the participants understandings of the situation 
and act so as to maintain this power differential. 
 Transformation redefinition – enlightenment and emancipation. This stage aims at 
enlightening participants to the true nature of the situation and thereby helping 
them to bring about change. It also reflexively develops social theory. Final validity is 
in the judgement of the participants. 
Table 3 shows a range of critical research approaches and how they can be mapped to 
Alvesson and Deetz’s (2000) three stages. 
 
 
                                                        
8 We have developed around their actual criteria 
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Alvesson 
and Deetz 
(2000) 
Myers and Klein 
(2011) 
Cecez-
Kecmanovic 
(2011) 
Johnson et al 
(2006) based on 
Kincheloe and 
Mclaren (2005)  
Critical realism 
(Bhaskar 1994; 
Mingers 2009; 
Mingers 2014) 
Insight Interpretive 
research 
Critical 
understanding 
 Critical theory 
concepts 
 Emancipatory 
values 
 Choice of 
research 
methods 
Research designs 
that are 
participative and 
democratic, and 
approximate 
Habermas’s ideal 
speech situation.  
Reflexive analysis 
of researchers’ 
interests and 
assumptions  
 
Science is value-
laden not value-
free and should be 
used to 
understand the 
true nature of 
society 
Critique Utilize critical 
theories 
Explicitly adopt 
social values 
Reveal and 
challenge the 
status quo 
Critical 
explanation and 
generalization 
 Hidden 
mechanisms 
 Wider 
contextualizati
on 
 Social and 
power 
relations 
Critical 
ethnography to 
sensitize 
researchers and 
participants to how 
society distorts the 
subjectivities of 
participants 
Comparison of 
particular context 
with other 
comparable ones 
Explanatory 
critique - a 
critique of the 
false beliefs held 
by social actors 
and the social/ 
organizational 
structures that 
maintain them 
 
Transforma
tive 
redefinition 
Emancipation 
Improve society 
Improve social 
Open discourse 
 Non-distorted 
communicatio
n 
Catalytic validity – 
the extent to which 
the research 
Theory practice 
consistency – 
given the 
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theory  Transformative 
praxis 
Reflexive  
dialectic 
 
changes 
participants self-
understandings 
and thereby enable 
them to change 
the situation 
Credibility for 
participants is vital 
explanatory 
critique, this 
should lead to 
action dedicated 
to removing the 
constraints and ills 
Then 
universalizing this 
to similar 
constraints and 
problems in other 
contexts 
Table 3 Different approaches to critical research 
From this we can see that e-correctness concerns the actual success of the critical analysis in 
terms of the change of consciousness of the participants, and change of oppressive social 
arrangements. This is ultimately to be judged by the participants themselves rather than the 
researchers. I-correctness concerns the process of research and analysis itself and whether 
it has properly followed the research steps as described in Table 3. This is summarized in 
Table 4. 
Form of 
research 
i-correctness, 
normative, verification, 
precision, formative 
e-correctness, 
descriptive, validation, 
accuracy, summative 
Relevant forms of 
truth 
Behavioral 
statistical 
research 
(positivist as 
Formative validation: 
 Content 
 Construct 
Summative validation: 
 Comparison of 
predictions with 
actuality, e.g., 
Correspondence 
between constructs 
and concepts, and 
between results and 
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defined by 
Straub (1989) 
and Lee and 
Hubona 
(2009)) 
 Reliability 
 Statistical 
validity 
cross-validation 
 Elimination of 
alternative 
explanations 
actuality; 
Coherence of 
constructs 
Simulation 
and other 
mathematical 
modelling 
Verification: 
 Model comparison 
 Extreme conditions 
 Degeneracy tests 
 Sensitivity analysis 
 Replications 
Conceptual and 
operational validation: 
 Predictive validation 
 Historical data 
 Event validation 
 Face validation 
 Graphical animation 
Credibility 
Correspondence 
between results and 
actuality; 
Coherence of 
model; 
Pragmatism and 
consensus about 
operational validity 
 
Interpretive 
research
  - 
 - emic 
Formative validation: 
 Descriptive validity 
 Interpretive validity 
 Consistency 
 Credibility 
 Dependability 
Summative validation 
 Authenticity in the eyes 
of the 
participants/subjects 
 Performativity – the 
stranger test 
Correspondence 
between description 
and participants 
world; 
Consensus about 
authenticity of 
results 
  - etic  Theoretical validity 
 
 Plausibility in the eyes of 
the research community 
Consensus about 
plausibility of 
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theoretical 
interpretation 
Design 
research 
 Methodological validity 
 Efficiency 
 Ethicality 
 Elegance 
 Efficacy that the system 
works 
 Effectiveness that it does 
the right thing 
 
Pragmatism and 
consensus about 
operational success 
Coherence of design 
method 
Action 
research 
 Declaration of theory 
and methodology 
 Active application of 
theory  and 
participation in 
situation 
 Recoverability 
 Effectiveness that the 
problematic issue has 
been alleviated 
 Justification of theoretical 
contribution 
 Generalizability to other 
contexts 
Pragmatism and 
consensus about 
operational success 
Consensus about 
plausibility of 
theoretical learning 
Coherence of results 
with methods used 
Critical 
research 
 Critical perspective and 
use of critical theories 
 Participative research 
design 
 Analysis of underlying, 
coercive mechanisms 
 Comparison with other 
context 
 Researcher reflexivity 
 Enlightenment of 
individual participant 
 Change of social 
arrangements 
 Judged by the 
participants 
Correspondence of 
theory to social 
mechanisms 
Pragmatism and 
consensus about 
enlightenment and 
change 
Table 4 The correctness framework of IS research 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
To begin with we would like to make it clear what we are not suggesting. First that we are 
not prescribing or privileging any particular research methods, indeed our whole argument 
is based on the idea that all these approaches (and others we have not covered) may well 
be able to contribute to information systems whether it is in terms of knowledge, 
understanding, or practical developments. This is true for a single research method or for a 
combination of methods within a multimethodology (Mingers 2001a; Mingers 2011; 
Venkatesh et al. 2013), which is actually our preferred option. Second, we are not 
suggesting direct changes to specific research methods, whether it is the statistical analysis 
of surveys or the coding of ethnographic data, but we are suggesting that they should be 
carried out with more concern for, and consideration of, their validation. 
The implications of our analysis of truth and correctness are as follows. Research is often 
carried out and published with little explicit regard for its validation (Boudreau et al. 2001; 
Jones 2004; King et al. 2005; Straub 1989) . The main argument of this paper is that this is 
not acceptable. For research to make a genuine contribution, either to knowledge or to 
practice, and to be published in journals or lead to organizational change, every effort must 
be made to demonstrate that the results are valid, that is believed to be true or correct.  
As we have demonstrated, there are two fundamental and distinct characteristics – internal 
correctness and external correctness, also known as verification and validation or formative 
and summative. The first is normative and concerns the way in which the research has been 
carried out; the second is descriptive and concerns the relationship of the research findings 
40 
 
to the external world. We have shown within the framework criteria for both of these across 
a wide range of research approaches. We agree with Lee and Hubona (2009) that much less 
attention is paid to e-correctness than i-correctness and yet arguably the latter is more 
important. 
It is tempting also to align these two with rigor and relevance. Certainly i-correctness 
concerns the rigor of the research, and e-correctness is at least related to its relevance 
although there may be very abstract research which does not, at the time, seem to have 
much direct relevance but one only needs to think of the laser or prime number theory to 
see how such research may later come to have huge relevance. 
The way in which research does need to change is that it needs to explicitly consider both 
these aspects of correctness at all stages – the design of the research, its operationalization, 
and its description and dissemination. We hope that the framework can provide a checklist 
for researchers to consider in designing their research, and for referees and editors to look 
for when evaluating submissions or grant applications. 
We believe that it is important that we have produced a framework that encompasses a 
wide range of methods. Too often, different research methods are seen to be in 
competition or even in conflict with each other. The framework demonstrates that they can 
all be seen as sharing some very basic characteristics, and are all ultimately part of the same 
human drive to better understand and improve the world. By focusing explicitly on both 
internal and external correctness we hope that the results of research will be more 
informative and effective. 
In terms of limitations and further research, we note the following. The framework could be 
developed to include further research approaches that we have not considered, for example 
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theoretical computer science or feminist research or multimethodology.  It could also be 
developed internally to provide a greater discrimination within approaches, especially the 
interpretive area where it may be found useful to have different criteria for, say, 
hermeneutics, phenomenology, textual analysis or semiotics. The advantage of a framework 
such as this is that it makes everything explicit (Klein et al. 1999) so that it can act as a 
trigger for debate. It may well be that proponents of particular methods may disagree with 
our validity criteria but at least there is now a target to be aimed at. 
For a major research question it may be that all the validity criteria cannot be answered 
within a single study – there may need to be sequential studies, perhaps some formative, 
and then later ones summative; or different methods may need to be applied to different 
aspects of the situation, thus invoking different validity questions. These considerations 
clearly lead on to the possibility of mixed methods work. They also touch on the question of 
generalizability. In this paper we have distinguished the e-correctness (or validity) of a 
particular study from the extent to which it can be generalized to other contexst, but the 
two are clearly related, and the generalization question raises its own validity issues that we 
have not here addressed.  
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APPENDIX A TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF TRUTH 
Robust truth theories 
Correspondence Theory 
The essence of correspondence theory is what is called “alethic9 realism”, that is that truth 
depends on the way the world actually is, so truth has a nature and its nature is objective – 
it depends on the world itself, not what we believe about it. Correspondence theories 
involve specifying what may be true (truth bearer), the “reality” to which it corresponds 
(truth maker), and the nature of the correspondence relation. There have been a variety of 
answers to these questions as shown in Table 1. 
 
Theory Truth bearer Relation Truth maker 
Russell (1906) Beliefs A structural isomorphism 
between the belief and the 
facts 
Facts – a 
complex unity of 
parts and 
relations 
Austin (1950) Propositions or 
sentences 
Correlation, sometimes 
conventional, rather than 
structural isomorphism 
Things, features, 
facts, states of 
affairs 
Field (1974) Words or 
sentences 
A causal relation – states 
of affairs lead us to make 
particular statements 
The world 
Alston (2001) Propositions – 
the content of 
Objective, mind-
independent, non-
Facts about how 
the world is 
                                                        
9 From the Greek meaning related to truth 
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the act of 
stating or 
believing  
epistemic (i.e., not based 
on our evidence) 
Table 1 Examples of correspondence theories 
These different versions of correspondence theory all share the core concept that there is 
something, the mind-independent world, that makes our beliefs or propositions true 
whether or not we can discover or justify that truth. 
There are many objections to correspondence theory. In brief: 
 The consistency problem -that beliefs or statements are different kinds of thing to 
states of affairs or facts in the world and that the two cannot logically be compared. 
Beliefs can only be compared with other beliefs. 
 The realism problem - that we do not have epistemological access to an independent 
external reality, we always experience it through our perceptions, cognitions and 
language, and so we could never discover if our beliefs are true 
 The justification problem - that the truth of a proposition is independent of our 
justification for it so all our beliefs could be false. 
 The scope problem - that propositions could be of so many different kinds (scientific, 
mathematical, fictional, moral etc.) that there can be no one property or causal 
relation than makes them all true 
These arguments have led to the main, substantive, alternatives to correspondence. 
Coherence theory 
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Coherence theories differ in terms of both the truth relation and the form of truth maker. In 
general, coherence theories specify that the relationship is one of internal consistency and 
coherence with some set of other consistent propositions or beliefs rather than any 
reference to an external world. Theoretical holism (Quine et al. 1978) requires that a belief 
is logically consistent with some system of beliefs but does not specify precisely what that 
set might be. Joachim (1906) argued that that the set of beliefs must form a comprehensive 
and significant systems of beliefs, and Blanshard (1941) went further saying that such a 
system should be comprehensive in including all known facts, and where each judgement 
should entail and be entailed by every other. More recently, Alcoff has suggested that the 
system should not consist just of beliefs but also of social practices, traditions and life 
events. And, moreover, that there can be different sets of beliefs, accounting for different 
experiences of the world, which may not necessarily be contradictory.  Coherence theory 
has been applied in specific domains such as mathematics. 
Pragmatist and consensus theories 
These theories judge truth not in terms of correspondence to reality, but in terms of the 
degree of evidence, agreement or usefulness. For this reason they are called epistemic 
theories. They can be traced to the American pragmatist philosophers. For instance, truth 
for Peirce (1878) was “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate”.  For James (1976) what is important is what practical effect truth would have - 
“true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas 
are those that we cannot”.  Dewey (1938) introduced the idea of “warranted assertibility”: 
“If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the institution of conditions which remove need for 
doubt. The latter state of affairs may be designated by the words belief and knowledge. For 
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reasons that I shall state later I prefer the words ‘warranted assertibility’”. Thus, from this 
perspective, there is not an absolute truth, certainly not in correspondence with an external 
reality. Rather, truth (or perhaps knowledge) is always provisional and fallible, based on the 
best evidence and information that we have, and moving towards but never perhaps 
reaching, the ideal of certainty.  
In more recent times, Putnam (1981) was close to this view in arguing that truth was what 
we would agree on under ideal epistemic conditions, “ideal warranted assertibility” which 
would depend on the particular entities being studied and was an ideal in the sense that it 
could be approached but never realized in practice (he later moved away from this 
approach). Wright (2009) has proposed the alternative notion of “superassertibility”.  For 
Peirce and Putman, getting closer to the truth involves gaining more and more precise 
information under increasingly ideal conditions. Wright suggests instead that, given some 
reasonable and practical evidence or information in favor of an idea, we should ask, would it 
remain warranted no matter how the information was improved or enlarged in the future. 
“A statement is superassertible, then, if and only if it is or can be warranted and some 
warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive 
increments to, or other forms of improvement of, our information” (Wright 2001, p. 771).  
This notion has been suggested as applicable to domains such as ethics. 
Habermas, too, has had an essentially pragmatist/consensus theory of truth but he has 
changed in a significant way more recently. Originally, with his theory of knowledge 
constitutive interests (Habermas 1978), he identified three forms of science – 
empirical/analytic, hermeneutic (normative) and emancipatory – but all three were 
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underpinned by a discursive theory of truth. Like Putnam, he discussed the circumstances 
under which ideal agreement could be reached and called the “ideal speech situation” 
where the truth would be generated by “the unforced force of the better argument” 
[Habermas, 1974 #1516, p. 240; Habermas, 2003 #2094, p. 37]. So at that point, truth was 
identified with that which would emerge through infinite, unfettered debate. 
However, he now [Habermas, 2003 #2094] recognises a substantive difference between the 
empirical domain and the normative domain. Whereas normative or moral issues can only 
ever be established through debate and discourse, propositional statement about the 
material world can now be proved wrong by events even if they were to be the result of an 
ideal debate.  
“I have given up an epistemic conception of truth and have sought to distinguish more 
clearly between the truth of a proposition and its rational assertability (even under 
approximately ideal conditions).” [Habermas, 2003 #2094, p. 8]  
Habermas now accepts the basic realist view that there is a world independent of human 
beings; that we all experience the same world; and that this places constraints upon us;, 
whilst still accepting that our access to this world is inevitable conditioned or filtered 
through our concepts and language.  
“These objections have prompted me to revise the discursive conception of rational 
acceptability by relating it to a pragmatically conceived, nonepistemic concept of truth, but 
without thereby assimilating ‘truth’ to ‘ideal assertability’” [Habermas, 2003 #2094p. 38] 
(original emphasis) 
Deflationist theories 
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There are a range of theories that call into question the fundamental premise of robust 
theories that truth does in fact have a substantial nature which needs to be explained. 
Ramsey (1927) held that the concept of truth was essentially redundant. In saying “it is true 
that snow is white” we are actually adding nothing to saying “snow is white”. The latter 
assumes or presumes the idea of truth and there nothing else to be said.  
Strawson (1950) held that truth was essentially performative in that, in saying “it is true that 
snow is white” we are really just recommending or agreeing to the claim, so the truth 
predicate is not a property but an endorsement.  
Quine (1992) argued that truth was disquotational. That is: 
“’Snow is white is true’ if and only if snow is white. To ascribe truth to the sentence is to 
ascribe whiteness to snow; such is the correspondence in this example. Ascription of truth 
just cancels the quotation marks. Truth is disquotation.” (Quine 1992, p. 78) 
Horwich (1991) held what he called a minimalist theory of truth. This has no theory of what 
truth is, but says simply that it is a logical system that has as its axioms every single instance 
of the general propositional form “The proposition that p is true iff p”. There will be an 
infinite number of these, for example “the proposition that snow is white is true if and only 
if snow is white”. 
As can be seen, each of these theories, in different ways, denies that there should be a 
substantive explanation of the concept of truth. This is, in general, not a conclusion that 
many philosophers accept, and there are particular criticisms of each of the individual 
approaches - see  Lynch (2001) Section VI for details. 
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